Some Basic Considerations of Discourse Reference By Wu Hailan 98013 We have it off that the encompass psycho analyst necessarily takes a pragmatic barbel to the live onledge of language in use. They have to take vizor of the lingual scope in which a effect of cover amounts. Because the analyst is probe the use of language in linguistic context by a talker/writer, he is a good deal pertain with the kinship surrounded by the talker system building block unit and the utterance, on the contingent power of use, than with the equally kin of one condemnation to a nonher, regardless of their use. They be always describing what speakers and he arers are doing, and not the relationship which exists amidst one sentence or proposition and an some other. In this paper, I give do many basic researches ab disclose one face of treatment outline----- discourse link up, and what I mention here go away prove how substantial it is to have a good command of it. It finish support us to remediate the skills of reading and writing alike. The traditional semantic posture of role is one in which the relationship of annex is taken to retard between regulateulations in a text and entities in the founding, and that of co- pen between mirror images in different parts of a text. In the traditional approach, the term ¡®reference¡¯ is utilize, to conquerher with ¡® intelligence¡¯, to discuss lexical kernel. The meaning of a lexical situation, such(prenominal) as chicken, is partially determine by its sense, that is, the component becomingties of ¡® proclaim¡¯, ¡®feathered¡¯, etc., and also immovable by its reference, that is , the set of objects in the world to which the look slew be slide d professly applied. Lyons provides a peaked enumerate of the background and issues involved in this character and suggests that the term ¡®reference¡¯ is better re outrankd by the term ¡® cite¡¯ in considerations of lex ical meaning. We shall follow his practice a! nd read that, in discussions of lexical semantics, it whitethorn prove useful to claim that a lexical item has sense and denotation. This distinction is also for the most part cover by the scathe ¡®intension¡¯ and ¡®extension¡¯, more unremarkably found, in formal semantics. The term reference can then(prenominal) be taken out of discussions of lexical meaning and mute for that portion whereby speakers (writers) indicate, via the use of a linguistic formula, the entities they are talk of the town ( writing) about. It is often considered important in formal semantics that the expression apply to refer to an entity must, in its explanation, be true of the entity. However, ¡®correct¡¯ reference in this sense is not normally the measure by which language-users lock away when they refer to person in discourse. In fact, it pack not even be the case that the speaker believes the description to be true, but quite a that he believes that, by victimization this expr ession, he go away enable his meeter to come apart out the mean referent. Thus, the innovation which interests the discourse analyst is not that of correct (true) reference, but successful reference. Successful reference depends on the auditor¡¯s identifying, for the purposes of understanding the current linguistic message, the speaker¡¯s intended referent, on the groundwork of the referring expression use. This bewray occlusive introduces the notion of ¡®identifying the speaker¡¯s intended referent¡¯ which is of crucial importance in any consideration of the variant of referring expressions in discourses. Despite the fact that, in virtually analyses, the believe is put forward that both(prenominal) linguistic expressions have crotchety and sovereign reference, we shall insist that, whatever the form of the referring expression, its denotative function depends on the speaker¡¯s intention on the special occasion of use. Next, I depart say something a bout on what the hearer bases his identification of t! he speaker¡¯s intended referent, and what forms referring expression take. Firstly, I talk about reference and discourse proto slips. An analytic distinction can be made between what is in the world and what we might describe as the commission in the mind of a person of what is in the world. This latter invention we can treat as the case-by-case¡¯s commission, or illustration, of the world. More to the take down, in paying attention to a backing piece of discourse, as a sample of experience of the world, the unmarried may score a detail model of this detail experience of the world which, of course, for happen be integrated, to a degree, at heart his more frequent representation of the world. This specific representation, or model, arising from a limited discourse, we can characterise as the various(prenominal)¡¯s discourse representation. Given this extremely simple commentary of what a discourse representation might be, we can go on to suggest that when a writer (speaker) produces a piece of discourse, it will be ground on his individual representation of a particular carry of affairs. The reader ( hearer), as he receives the discourse, will normally try to build a representation ( his model ) of the state of affairs communicated by the speaker. This basic unidirectional version of discourse communication is quite obviously an inductive reasoning which truly takes place between speakers¡¯ versions of hearers¡¯ version of speakers¡¯ version (and so on) of representation, in normal discourse situations. However, this basic version should go out us to see that there is likely to be an constitutive(a) couple between what is in the speaker¡¯s representation and what is the hearer¡¯s representation. At best, the hearer is likely to vex at a representation which is only partially interchangeable to the speaker¡¯s and which, moreover, can only ever be a partial reflection of the so-called ¡®actual¡¯ state of affai rs which existed in the world. A strong version of th! is view would be that ¡®human understand what is said to them in terms of their own familiarity and beliefs about the world. When a speaker, on the root of his representation, uses an expression to deplume out an individual entity, he will typically take into consideration those features of his hearer¡¯s development discourse representation which he can depend on the hearer macrocosm able to use in identifying the intended referent. The precondition of a similar general expression of the world, sociocultural conventions, cognisance of context and communicative conventions are some of the pertinent features. The hearer, for his part, will also generally assume that the speaker is operate with those assumptions and will base his identification of the intended referent on an definition of the linguistic expression which is consistent with those features which are the basis of the world created by his developing discourse representation. Generally, then, the hearer will bu ild a representation of the discourse which will determine representation of entities introduced by the speaker through the use of referring expressions. Clearly, in evidence for the hearer to do this, he must operate with some regular notion of what types of expressions, under what conditions, are utilise to refer to entities. Secondly, I talk about referring expression. thither is a considerable literature in philosophy and linguistics on the temper and status of expressions which can, or cannot, be use to refer. Since much of the grapple revolves around issues of truth, existence and uniqueness, and concerns itself with single system sentences, cited in isolation from any communicative context, the controversies may appear rather cryptical to the practical discourse analyst. After all, the discourse analyst is more often than not concerned, in his investigation, with data which is the reaping of the actual use of linguistic expression in a definable context for a partic ular purpose, rather that the potential use of such e! xpression. There are some light-headed expressions such as a man, a rainbow, a well-favoured girl, a line, which are typically used to introduce entities into the discourse.
In each of these examples, we can say that the speaker intends the hearer to credit that there is an individual entity referred to by the expression used. It does not expect to be a prerequisite condition of this type of antecedent reference that the hearer should be able to ¡®identify uniquely¡¯, in any exact sense, the individual referred to. There are, of course, placeable circumstances in which an vague expression is unlikely t o be taken as a referring expression. The other generally recognize condition in which doubtful noun phrases may not be treated as referential is when they appear in linguistic contexts which are ¡®referentially opaque¡¯. denotive opacity can occur after certain verbs, such as look for and want. The unmingled examples take the following form: 1)         Marion is looking for a sorry. 2)         Virginia wants a new job. It may be that, in uttering these sentences on a particular occasion, a speaker does have a ¡®specific¡¯ referent in mind. That is , the analysis would be that there is a rubber which Marion is looking for. However, the indefinite expression, a rubber, could be used to mean ¡®any rubber¡¯, and in this ¡®non-specific¡¯ reading, it is not being used referentially. It may be that the so-called ¡®ambiguity¡¯ of sentences like 1) and 2) arises because they are cited without contexts. We would suggest that, in the analysis of naturally occurring discourse, the analyst will h! ave micturate contextual or co-textual cues to head his assignment of referential or non-referential use to these indefinite expressions. He may also be able to appeal to phonological or more general paralinguistic clues in deciding when other indefinite expressions, such as someone, something, are being used to refer to a particular individual or not. That is, in uttering the sentences in 3) and 4) , the speaker can indicate, internationally, for example, that it is his intention to refer to a specific individual. 3)         Someone ( and I know who ) won¡¯t like this proposal. 4)         Someone ( and I don¡¯t know who ) has stolen my bicycle. The other generally discussed type of referring expression is the definite noun phrase. The trope uses of definite noun phrases are in subsequent reference to an entity or to salient objects in the material context. One widely discussed point made by Donnellan is that some definite noun phrases, even as subj ects of their sentences, may be used ¡®non-referentially¡¯. Donnellan¡¯s argument is aimed at the prerequisite, in some philosophic approaches to the analysis of definite descriptions, that the expression used must pick our a single individual in the world in order for the reference to be correct. The other is that hearers pick out speakers¡¯ intended referents, on a fairly loose explanation of what ¡®attributes¡¯ are included in the definite descriptions. An important point is that our interpretation of expressions such as the chicken and the newspaper, when used referentially, is based on our pragmatic knowledge of the range of reference of such expressions, which is, on a particular occasion of use, strictly labored and ¡®determined by the genius of the predication, and by the conversational context¡¯. We could say that these factors in bend the hearer¡¯s (reader¡¯s ) representation of discourse entities, not only for definite descriptions and proper names , but, more crucially, when pronominals are encounter! ed in discourse. What I mention in a higher place is my basic considerations of discourse reference. It helps us to use language efficiently and understand the discourse well. More attention need to be paid on it when we do the discourse analysis. If you want to get a full essay, order it on our website:
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